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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
ROBERT E. CONGER, ] 
Appellant, 
vs. 
TEL TECH, INC., 
Respondent. ] 
i BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Case No. 870129-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon 
this Court by Utah Const., art. VIII# §§ 3 and 5, and by Utah 
R. App. P. 3 and 4. 
This action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, seeking the recovery of 
damages for personal injuries. On motion of defendant Tel 
Tech, Inc., the lower court entered a final order of summary 
judgment dismissing the lawsuit as against that defendant on 
October 3, 1984. An order denying plaintiff's motion to amend 
and/or for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and 
60(b)(7) was entered on December 6, 1984. This appeal is from 
those final orders. Final judgment adjudicating the claims of 
all of the parties was entered January 12, 1987. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Tel Tech 
on the ground it owed no duty to 
plaintiff, where material issues of 
fact exist as to the existence of that 
duty. 
II. Whether the district court erred in 
ruling that Tel Tech did not breach any 
duty it owed, despite the existence of 
material issues of fact. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature, Course and Disposition of the Case in 
the Court Below. 
On September 2, 1982, appellant Robert E. Conger 
("Conger") filed a complaint seeking damages for personal 
injuries against Tel Tech, Inc., etc. The gravamen of the 
complaint against Tel Tech charged that Tel Tech owed and had 
assumed a duty to provide a safe way of cleaning out a milk 
tanker it had contracted to modify for this purpose and Tel 
Tech had negligently breached this duty, proximately resulting 
in injuries to Conger (Index, pp. 2-5). Tel Tech denied the 
material allegations of the complaint (Index, pp. 44-48). On 
July 23, 1984, Tel Tech filed a motion for summary judgment 
(Index, pp. 185-187), which the lower court granted in a 
memorandum decision dated September 20, 1984 (Index, pp. 
349-353). The court's decision was grounded on its conclusion 
that, based on its view of the factual setting, Tel Tech owed 
no duty to plaintiff. In its amended summary judgment signed 
on October 30, 1984, however, the lower court, in a somewhat 
ambiguous statement, ruled as a matter of law that Tel Tech 
"breached no duty owed" to the plaintiff and ordered the 
lawsuit against Tel Tech dismissed with prejudice (Index, pp. 
363-365). On November 6, 1984, plaintiff appealed specifically 
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from this ruling, and the lower court denied plaintiff's motion 
for relief and entered judgment on December 6, 1984. By-
stipulation, the case against defendants other than Tel Tech 
and Western General Dairy, Inc. was settled and ordered 
dismissed on January 12, 1987 (Index, pp. 620-621A). A notice 
of appeal was filed on February 4, 1987 (Index, pp. 622-626). 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff Robert E. Conger was employed by Beatrice 
Foods Company, Meadow Gold Division (hereafter "Meadow Gold"). 
In the course of Conger's responsibilities on January 1, 1981, 
he was walking on the top of a stainless steel milk tanker at 
the Meadow Gold facility in Salt Lake City to connect a hose to 
a "spray ball" cleaning attachment on top of the tanker, for 
the purpose of cleaning out the inside of the tanker. As he 
stepped on the smooth steel skin, Mr. Conger slipped off and 
fell to the ground, sustaining serious spinal injuries which 
rendered him permanently and totally disabled. (Index, p. 637, 
Robert Conger depo. at 86, 98-103.) The top of the tanker had 
no grit or adhesive strips along the skin, handrails, or other 
form of walk protection. (Id. at 63). 
The milk tanker at issue had been purchased by Meadow 
Gold in March of 1979. On May 7, 1979, at the request of 
Meadow Gold, Tel Tech installed two spray ball stations on top 
of the tanker, towards each end of the tanker, to facilitate 
cleaning the inside of the tanker in the manner that Mr. Conger 
was attempting to do the day of his injury. (Index, p. 640, 
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Don Dvorak depo. at 32.) Prior to the time that Tel Tech 
installed the spray balls, there was no need for any Meadow 
Gold employees to walk along the top of the tanker. (Index, 
p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 44-45.) 
Meadow Gold had requested Tel Tech to install the 
spray balls on the tanker because it understood and relied upon 
Tel Tech to have expertise in the installation and servicing of 
dairy equipment and in working with stainless steel tankers. 
(Index, p. 640, Dvorak depo. at 19-21.) 
Meadow Gold gave Tel Tech no directions or 
instructions as to the manner of installation or any steps 
necessary to ensure that the spray balls could be safely 
operated. Had Tel Tech installed walk protection in connection 
with the installation of the spray balls, Meadow Gold would 
have accepted and paid for that walk protection. (Id. at 
21-22.) 
Tel Tech, prior to the installation of the spray balls 
on the tanker in this action, had assisted in the installation 
of spray balls on dairy tankers on at least five or six 
occasions, and was aware of the fact that tankers with such 
spray ball stations were often equipped with some form of walk 
protection. (Index, p. 636, Randy Telford depo. at 10-11; 
Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 9-10, 15-17.) 
At the time Tel Tech installed the spray balls on the 
tanker in question in May of 1979, it was acquainted with the 
nature of dairy facilities and had accumulated substantial 
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experience in the sale and installation of dairy equipment at 
dairy facilities, including equipment on dairy tankers• 
(Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 12-17, 20-23.) Tel 
Tech was also aware of the fact that dairy tankers often have 
slippery surfaces, and that after such spray balls are 
installed, it is recognized and assumed that persons would have 
to walk on the top of the tanker to get to the spray ball 
connections. (j^* at 20-21). Tel Tech was further aware of 
the fact that due to slippery surfaces of such tankers, persons 
could foreseeably slip and injure themselves. (Id. at 25). 
Tel Tech was aware at the time that it installed the spray 
balls of the availability of at least two different types of 
walk protection for stainless steel dairy tankers. (Index, p. 
636, Randy Telford depo. at 10.) 
Tel Tech further knew that the installation of walk 
protection on tankers with spray ball assemblies was a safety 
measure, and that walk protection was a common safety feature 
on new milk tankers. (Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 
43-45.) Despite Tel Tech's knowledge of the above facts, it 
failed to apply any walk protection to the tanker for safe use 
of the spray balls. Moreover, Tel Tech failed to even warn or 
advise Meadow Gold about the danger to Meadow Gold employees 
created by Tel Tech's work on the tanker. (Index, p. 640, 
Dvorak depo. at 21.) 
Defendant Tel Tech filed its motion for summary 
judgment with a supporting memorandum in July of 1984, (Index, 
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pp. 185-187, and pp. 189-200) and Conger filed a memorandum in 
opposition to summary judgment (Index, pp. 214-229) and an 
affidavit of plaintiff's expert, Carl Eilers (Index, pp. 
234-237). Mr. Eilers has been involved with various aspects of 
liquid food or chemical tankers for over 28 years, and is the 
vice president and general manager of a company in the business 
of designing, manufacturing, repairing, and servicing truck and 
trailer tanks for dairy food and chemical industries. 
Mr. Eilers stated in his affidavit that on the tanker on which 
plaintiff was injured, the addition of the two spray balls by 
Tel Tech foreseeably required persons to climb on top of the 
tanker and walk along the top of the tanker in order to connect 
hoses to the spray balls. The addition of such spray balls 
created an obvious safety hazard, which in Mr. Eilers1 opinion 
could have been corrected by the addition of some form of walk 
protection (Index, pp. 235-236). Mr. Eilers testified that 
from his review of the depositions of the Tel Tech personnel, 
Tel Tech, based upon its knowledge and its expertise, could 
have and should have installed or at least recommended to 
Meadow Gold the installation of walk protection at the time 
that Tel Tech installed the spray balls (Index, pp. 236-237). 
After hearing oral argument on Tel Tech's motion for 
summary judgment, the district court issued a memorandum 
decision on September 20, 1984, granting the motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that Tel Tech owed no duty to Meadow Gold 
or its employees to install walk protection or to advise 
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concerning the installation of walk protection at the time that 
it installed the spray balls (Index, pp. 349-353). The amended 
summary judgment from which plaintiff appeals was thereafter 
signed on October 30, 1984, (Index, pp. 363-365) and the order 
of the court denying plaintiff's motion to amend or for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and 60(b)(7) was 
signed December 6, 1984 (Index, pp. 385-386). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court's entry of summary judgment on behalf 
of Tel Tech was premised on the view that the question of duty 
is purely one of law and not one of fact. (Index, p. 350, 
Memorandum Decision, September 20, 1984, p. 2.) This premise, 
however, is not the law of Utah where the decision as to 
whether a duty exists depends on the existence of facts 
concerning which the jury may reasonably come to more than one 
conclusion. In this case, the question as to whether a duty 
existed cannot be determined as a matter of law? certain 
material, disputed issues of fact must be submitted to the jury. 
The lower court granted summary judgment in this case 
before there was any determination as to whether Tel Tech 
breached its duty to make its product safe or to warn of its 
hazardous nature. The determination as to the extent to which 
a duty has been breached is typically a question of fact, and 
here a material fact. Because material, disputed issues of 




THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER TEL TECH OWES A 
DUTY TO PLAINTIFF DEPENDS ON DISPUTED 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AND IS, THEREFORE, A 
QUESTION FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE. 
In an appeal from summary judgment, the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the losing party. Hall v. 
Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah, 1981)? accord Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, in negligence cases summary judgment should be 
granted with great caution. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985); accord, Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723 (Utah 1985). In Apache Tank Lines, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present 
questions of fact to be resolved by the fact 
finder. It is only when the facts are 
undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion 
can be drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law. 
106 P.2d at 615. The question whether the district court erred 
in concluding in the face of disputed facts that Tel Tech owed 
no duty to plaintiff must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the evidence supporting Conger's view that such a duty 
exists. 
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A. Although the Question Whether a 
Defendant Owes a Duty Is Generally ""a* 
Decision for the Court, This General 
Rule Cannot Control Where the Existence 
of the Duty Depends Upon Issues of Fact 
as to Which a Jury Can Disagree. 
The law of negligence is well established that, 
generally, the question of whether a defendant owes a duty in a 
particular factual setting is a question of law for the Court. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B (1965); W. Prosser, The 
Law of Torts, 206 (4th ed. 1971)? Metropolitan Gas Repair 
Service, Inc. v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1980). For 
example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B provides that: 
In an action for negligence the court 
determines 
(a) . . . 
(b) whether such facts give rise to 
any legal duty on the part of the defendant; 
(c) . . . 
In comment c to the above section, the reporter states, "The 
determinations stated in this Section are always for the court 
to make." Based on such statements, and with regard to the 
typical negligence case, the above axiom is universally 
accepted. Typically, this first element of the traditional 
negligence case is well established and not in issue. But the 
law is equally well established, although less often addressed 
in the typical negligence case, that where the question of 
whether a defendant owes a duty can be answered differently 
depending on the resolution of material disputed facts, the 
question then must be submitted to the jury. This is well 
-9-
established in the Restatement comment on the above-quoted 
section of 328B: 
Comment on Clause (b); 
It is the further function of the court 
to determine whether, upon facts in evidence 
which the jury may reasonably find to be 
true, the law imposes upon the defendant any 
legal duty to act or to refrain from acting 
for the protection of the plaintiff. This 
decision is always for the court. Thus it 
is no part of the province of a jury to 
determine what duty a possessor land owes to 
an undiscovered trespasser. (See § 333.) 
Where the existence of the duty will depend 
upon the existence or nonexistence of a fact 
as to which the jury may reasonably come to 
either one of two conclusions — as* for 
example, whether the trespasser was in fact 
discovered — then it becomes the duty of 
the court to instruct the jury as to the 
defendant's duty, or absence of duty? if 
either conclusion as to such fact is drawn. 
(Emphasis added.) 
With regard to this issue, the example in the comment 
of the Restatement is enlightening. In some states, the duty 
by a possessor of land to a trespasser depends on whether the 
trespasser was in fact discovered by the landowner. Thus, the 
court would normally determine (prior to trial) whether the 
possessor of land owed any duty to the trespasser. But if the 
question whether the trespasser was discovered or not is 
disputed by the parties, then the issue of whether the 
possessor owes a duty must be submitted to the jury under 
appropriate instructions that would allow the jury to continue 
their deliberations if they found the existence of a duty, and 
to end their deliberations if they found an absence of a duty, 
depending on how they resolve the disputed issue of fact. 
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Utah law also provides that the question of whether a 
duty exists depends on factual issues. DCR, Inc. v. Peak 
Alarm, 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983). For example, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized with regard to a negligence claim 
arising out of a contract for services between parties, that a 
duty of due care can arise out of that relationship, and that 
the existence of the duty depends upon the proof of the nature 
of the relationship between the parties. j^ I.; Gitzhoffen v. 
Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Association, 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 
691, 696 (1907) ("While it may be said that this is an action 
of tort, and not on contract, nevertheless, in such an action, 
a plaintiff seeking to recover injuries sustained by him 
through the negligence of another must show that the latter 
committed a breach of some duty owing to the plaintiff or 
imposed for his benefit. To show what that duty was, it was 
proper to aver and prove the relationship between the parties"). 
Here, as shown in the statement of facts and discussed 
in more detail below, plaintiff demonstrated to the district 
court ample evidence of Tel Tech's expertise and knowledge, as 
well as the relationship between Meadow Gold and Tel Tech, 
which gave rise to a duty upon Tel Tech to Meadow Gold's 
employees who would foreseeably be exposed to the tanker's 
dangerous condition which Tel Tech created. Thus, the district 
court was clearly faced with the exception to the general rule 
set forth above, and erred by removing the determination of the 
factual issue from the jury. 
-11-
B. The District Cou.r,t. Failed to 
Acknowledge the Specific Circumstances 
of This Case Requiring the Submission 
of the Duty Issue to the Jury, 
As noted in the statement of facts above, Tel Tech was 
aware that surfaces in the dairy industry are slippery; that a 
Meadow Gold employee using the cleaning system installed by Tel 
Tech would walk on top of the tanker to the spray ball 
connections; and that a person could foreseeably slip from a 
tanker and be injured in the absence of walk protection. 
Meadow Gold requested Tel Tech to install the cleaning system 
because it knew that Tel Tech worked with stainless steel and 
in the dairy industry, and Meadow Gold relied on Tel Tech's 
experience and expertise to provide a new cleaning system that 
could be safely operated by Meadow Gold's employees. Tel 
Tech's installation of the spray balls created the danger to 
Meadow Gold employees, since prior to Tel Tech's work, no 
reason existed to be on top of the tanker. The spray ball 
installation, however, did create a reason for such employees 
to be on top of the slippery, curved tanker. 
The question thus arises whether under these 
circumstances Tel Tech had a duty either to make the cleaning 
process safe by installing walk protection or to warn Meadow 
Gold of the hazards. According to Restatement (Second) Torts 
§ 403, Tel Tech unquestionably had such a duty: 
§ 403. Chattel Known to Be Dangerous 
One who as an independent contractor makes, 
rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another and 
turns it over to the other, knowing or having 
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reason to know that his work has made it 
dangerous for the use for which it is turned 
over, is subject to the same liability as if he 
supplied the chattel. (Emphasis added.) 
The liability of a supplier of chattel is set forth in 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 392. 
§ 392. Chattel Dangerous for Intended Use 
One who supplies to another, directly or 
through a third person, a chattel to be used 
for the supplier's business purposes is subject 
to liability to those for whose use the chattel 
is supplied, or to those whom he should expect 
to be endangered by its probable use, for 
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel 
in the manner for which and by persons for 
whose use the chattel is supplied 
(a) if the supplier fails to exercise 
reasonable care to make the chattel safe for 
the use for which it is supplied, or 
(b) if he fails to exercise reasonable care to 
discover its dangerous condition or character, 
and to inform those whom he should expect to 
use it. 
The district court recognized the similarity of § 403 to Tel 
Tech's situation, but then erroneously concluded as a matter of 
law that § 403 was "distinguishable," because it found that 
"[u]se of the sprayballs did not make the tanker any more or 
less dangerous than it was before" and that as long as Tel 
Tech's work "does not cause the equipment to be dangerous, [Tel 
Tech] should not be held liable if the owner applies the 
equipment in a dangerous way." (Index, pp. 351-352; Addendum 1 
at pp. 3 and 4.) Given the above-referenced factual setting, 
these pure findings of fact by the trial court are wholly 
improper. 
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The trial court had before it the affidavit of Carl 
Eilers (Index, pp. 234-237), who is in the business of 
designing, manufacturing and repairing tanks for the dairy 
industry and who, like Tel Tech, installs cleaning systems for 
milk tankers. Eilers, based upon his review of the evidence, 
as well as his expertise and knowledge, provided his opinion 
that the installation of the spray balls did make the tanker 
more dangerous than it had been. He further stated that a 
reasonable person in Tel Tech's position installing such spray 
balls would foresee the danger posed by the new cleaning system 
and would either provide safety measures and/or warn the buyer 
of the potential hazard to which the installation of the 
cleaning system would expose workers• (Index, pp. 234-237, 
Carl Eilers Affidavit, pp. 1-2.) 
Tel Tech, on the other hand, asserts that it is not in 
the business of installing walkway guards, ladders or other 
safety equipment and thus owes no duty to make safe or to 
forewarn customers of the hazards its alterations pose. 
(Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 43; Index, p. 636, 
Randy Telford depo. at 11-12.) Clearly, this is a factual 
issue that goes to the heart of whether Tel Tech owes a duty. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reversed a summary 
judgment in a case similar to this one. In Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), the court ruled that an affidavit 
produced by an architect alleged sufficient facts as to whether 
negligence in the design, construction, or maintenance of a 
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third-story window in an apartment created an unreasonable risk 
to occupant safety. In Melby, a third-story bedroom window 
placed 22 inches above the floor gave way when the plaintiff 
arose from her bed during the night, stumbled and fell through 
the closed window. The Court held that the issue of both the 
landlord's and the contractor's liability was to be submitted 
to the fact finder on remand. The Melby decision followed the 
reasoning in Becker v. IRM Corp., 144 Cal.App.3d 321, 192 
Cal.Rptr. 570 (1983), stating; 
The court set aside a summary judgment 
because the case presented a factual issue 
as to whether the landlord could have 
learned of the defective condition of the 
property. Similarly here, a trier of fact 
might find that the landlord should have 
known that a defective condition existed and 
should have taken precautions to avert the 
risk. Therefore, since we cannot hold as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff was equally 
or more negligent than the Melbys, a triable 
issue of fact exists as to whether the 
Melbys breached their duty of care. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 728. In this case, at minimum, 
there is an issue of fact as to whether Tel Tech knew or should 
have known that its modification of the tanker created a new 
hazard and thus whether Tel Tech had a duty to avert that 
hazard. 
Tel Tech claimed, and the trial court apparently 
accepted as established fact, that the cleaning system was 
installed according to Meadow Gold's specifications, design 
and/or direction. Using this unsupported factual premise, the 
court relied on Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th 
-15-
Cir. 1973), as authority to grant summary judgment to Tel Techf 
finding that Spangler was the case "which is most nearly on 
point." (Index, pp. 349-353; Addendum 1.) Spangler, however, 
is significantly different. There, the manufacturer did not 
include a warning bell on the crane it manufactured according 
to the plans and specifications of the customer. Those 
specifications did not include any warning device. The 
Spangler court further noted that the manufacturer had relied 
upon the customer's expertise. No such evidence was before the 
trial court here. 
In contrast, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 729 
(Utah 1985), a contractors liability for negligence in the 
construction of a defective window was determined to be a 
question for the jury because the contractor chose the design 
and approved the plans for construction. Melby specifically 
distinguished Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co., 17 
Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965), a case relied upon by Tel Tech 
below on this issue. Where the contractor chooses the design, 
he is responsible to avoid unreasonable risks created in the 
final product. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 729. In the 
instant case, no specifications or instructions for 
installation at all were given by Meadow Gold, according to Don 
Dvorak, the Meadow Gold manager who contacted Tel Tech for 
installation of the cleaning system. (Index, p. 640, Dvorak 
depo. at 21-22.) He simply placed an oral order for the 
cleaning system. (Id.) Had Tel Tech installed walk 
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protection. Meadow Gold would have accepted it* (IcL at 
20-21•) In fact, Meadow Gold relied upon Tel Tech's expertise 
with stainless steel tankers and the installation of dairy 
equipment. (Id. at 21-22.) 
Tel Tech contracted to alter the tanker to allow 
cleaning through the spray ball devices which were situated by 
Tel Tech in such a way as to cause the hazardous situation. 
Tel Tech cannot claim ignorance of the environment in which the 
cleaning system would be used. It knew the spray ball system 
was for cleaning out milk tanks; it knew the placement of the 
spray ball connections would inevitably lead to an employee 
walking on the top of a tanker? it knew the dairy products 
created a slippery environment? and it knew that in the absence 
of walk protection on the tanker top, persons could slip and be 
injured. 
C. Under u.taft Law, the Issue of 
Foreseeability of Harm Is a Question of 
Fact. 
The foreseeability of harm is also a matter for the 
trier of fact even where a later actor is likely to be 
negligent. Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 
(Utah 1983). As indicated in Restatement (Second) Torts § 447, 
which was adopted in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), a person's negligence 
is not superseded by another's negligence if the subsequent 
negligence is foreseeable. 
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In the instant case, Tel Tech's cleaning system 
created a situation where a reasonable person would have 
foreseen the possible harm that could result. As such, Tel 
Tech had a duty to make the situation safe rather than simply 
ignore the hazard it had itself created. Tel Tech failed to 
make the milk tank# as modified by its cleaning system, safe 
for use. 
Even if Meadow Gold or Conger were subsequently 
negligent in setting up its work procedures, it is an issue of 
fact whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the 
likelihood of such negligent behavior and installed the 
cleaning system without providing safety devices for its 
intended use. Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra; Jensen 
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra. 
The trial court's misapprehension of these principles 
and its usurpation of the jury's function is demonstrated by 
the statement in its Memorandum Decision that "[t]he duty is 
upon the owner to use the equipment safely. If he does not, 
then he, not the independent contractor is responsible." 
(Index, p. 352; Addendum 1 at 4.) Clearly this is a 
fundamentally incorrect statement of the law according to 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra, and Jensen v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra. The trial court's 
decision must therefore be reversed. 
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II. 
WHETHER TEL TECH BREACHED ITS DUTY TO MAKE SAFE 
OR TO WARN IS A QUESTION OF MATERIAL FACT THAT 
MUST BE RESOLVED BY THE FACT FINDER. 
Whether a defendant breached a duty of care is, of 
course, generally a question for the jury, to be determined by 
whether the injury which occurred falls within the zone of risk 
created by defendant's negligent conduct. Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1985); Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1983), accord Little America 
Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982). As stated in 
Harris: 
[T]he right to trial by jury is a basic 
principle of our system that cannot be 
allowed to be eroded by improper intrusions 
on the jury's prerogative. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 at 220. 
The language of the trial court's Amended Summary 
Judgment is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the court found no 
duty, or that Tel Tech did not breach a duty it owed. Assuming 
the latter, the entry of summary judgment must be reversed, 
under the above-referenced principles and in view of the issues 
of material facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in determining that the issue of 
duty is purely a matter of law. Here, the issue of duty is so 
intertwined with disputed and material factual issues that it 
cannot be disposed of by law. Further, the question of whether 
such a duty was breached also requires the resolution of 
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disputed material issues of fact which preclude summary 
judgment. 
Summary judgment was erroneously entered on behalf of 
Tel Tech. That judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court for trial, which relief 
appellant respectfully seeks. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument of this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of June, 1987. 
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P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Respondent Tel-Tech, I 
-20-
ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. CONGER, : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, s 
CIVIL NO. C-82-7444 
vs. : 
TEL TECH, INC., et al., : 
Defendants. : 
The facts of this case, as I understand them are as follows: 
plaintiff Robert E. Conger is an employee of Meadow Gold Dairy 
(a division of Western General Dairies). He was injured on 
January 1, 1981 when he fell from a Meadow Gold truck. At the 
time, he was walking along the top of the tanker truck. 
About one year and eight months prior to the accident, 
defendant Tel Tech had installed two "sprayball stations" on 
the tanker. These are used to facilitate the cleaning of the 
tanks. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to th« 
plaintiff would indicate that it was not necessary to walk or 
top of the tanker before the sprayballs were installed; bu1 
after the sprayballs were installed the usual method of operating 
the cleaning system was to walk up the ladder to one station 
hook it on, and then walk along the top of the tank to the othe 
station. This is what the plaintiff was doing at the time h 
fell. 
CONGER V . TEL TECH PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
There were other ways to operate the system, however • 
For example, a s tep ladder could be used on each end of the 
truck (Randy Telford Dep. p. 23) , also a swinging walkway could 
he used (Leonard Telford Dep. p. 21) • 
The p l a i n t i f f ' s theory i s that Tel Tech should not have 
i n s t a l l e d the s p r a y b a l l s without a l s o i n s t a l l i n g a walkway, 
ra i l or other protect ive device, or at l eas t should have warned 
Meadow Gold that such a device was advisable. 
The issue i s one of duty; the question i s whether one who 
i n s t a l l s or r e b u i l d s equipment has a duty to i n s t a l l , or at 
l eas t recommend additional safety devices which make the equipment 
safer to use in various appl icat ions. 
There are additional questions, such as whether the danger 
was o b v i o u s , whether Meadow Gold had more or l e s s experience 
and expert i se than Tel Tech, and so forth. But these are factual 
q u e s t i o n s , not amenable to r e s o l u t i o n upon Summary Judgment. 
The question of duty, however, i s purely one of law. 
This case i s similar to , but not precise ly ident ical with 
those cases where an independent contrac tor performs work in 
compliance with the owner9 s plans and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . These 
cases uniformly hold that there i s no l i a b i l i t y , un le s s the 
plans are so d e f e c t i v e that they would not be followed by a 
reasonable person. In th i s case, however, there were no formal 
plans or s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . 
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The case is also similar to, but distinguishable from the 
situation described in Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 403, 
where an independent contractor rebuilds a chattel, and then 
turns it over to the owner in a condition dangerous for ordinary 
use. The critical distinction here is that the actual work 
performed, the installation of the sprayballs, was not improper 
in any way. Use of the sprayballs did not make the tanker any 
more or less dangerous than it was before. It was the application 
of the truck with its sprayballs, i.e., walking on top of the 
truck, that created the danger. 
I believe that the case cited which is most nearly on point 
is Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). 
In that case Kranco had installed a crane properly, but had 
not installed a bell or warning device. The court held that 
there was no duty to do so, because the need for the device 
depended upon the environment in which the crane was to be used. 
Similarly, whether a walkway was needed on the milk truck dependend 
upon what equipment Meadow Gold had, and what its work rules 
were. 
The converse view is expressed by Judge Butzner in the 
dissent in the Spangler case. I do not believe that any of 
the Utah cases provide guidance as to which approach should 
be followed. There are two important competing policies in 
balance: the right of the injured workman to recover, when 
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he r e a l l y had no contro l over the environment in which the truck 
was to be u s e d ; and the r ight of a contractor to perform work 
r e q u e s t e d w i t h o u t making f u r t h e r i n q u i r y as to the s p e c i f i c 
u s e , a p p l i c a t i o n and environment in which the o b j e c t i s to be 
used. I b e l i e v e that on ba lance t h e v iew of t h e m a j o r i t y in 
Spangler i s c o r r e c t . A contractor should be allowed to perform 
the work he i s asked to perform without imposing a duty upon 
him to i n v e s t i g a t e the uses to which an owner w i l l put the equip-
ment. So l ong as he performs h i s work in a workmanlike way, 
and h i s work does not cause the equipment to be d a n g e r o u s , he 
should n o t be he ld l i a b l e i f the owner a p p l i e s the equipment 
in a dangerous way. The duty i s upon the owner to use the equipment 
s a f e l y . I f he does not , then he, not the independent contractor 
i s r e s p o n s i b l e . I f , as in t h i s c a s e , the owner i s s h i e l d e d 
from l i a b i l i t y by workmen fs compensation, then the workman i s 
in e x a c t l y the same p o s i t i o n as i f he had been i n j u r e d by the 
neg l igence of h i s employer in any other s e t t i n g . 
The Motion for Summary Judgment i s g r a n t e d . Mr. Berry 
i s r e q u e s t e d t o prepare an a p p r o p r i a t e Order, and submit to 
Mr. Wilcox and Mr. King pursuant to Rule 2.9 
Dated t h i s £p day of September, 1984. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t 1 mai led a t rue and c o r r e c t copy 
of the f o r e g o i n g Memorandum Dec i s ion , postage prepaid, to the 
fo l l owing , t h i s day of September, 1984s 
W. Brent Wilcox 
Colin P. King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Raymond M. Berry 
Mark A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Defendant Tel Tech 
10 Exchange place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Curtis J. Drake 
Attorney for Defendant Gallagher 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jay E® Jensen 
William Hansen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Western General Dairy 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah -84101 
George M. Haley 
Attorney for Defendant Wetzel 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM 2 
W. Brent Wilcox, Esq. (A-3464) 
Colin P. King, Esq. (A-1815) 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Keacns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT POR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP .UTAH 
ROBERT E. CONGER, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
TEL-TECH, INC., ARTHUR J. 
GALLAGHER & CO., WESTERN 
GENERAL DAIRY, INC. and ] 
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
1 AMENDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
> Civil No. C-82-7444 
i Judge Scott Daniels 
Pursuant to Rule 56, defendant Tel-Tech, Inc.'s Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Publish Depositions came on 
for hearing before the above-entitled court on Friday, 
September 7, 1984, Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, W. Brent 
Wilcox and Colin P. Kiag appearing for the plaintiff, Raymond 
M. Berry and Mark A. Larsen appearing for defendant Tel-Tech, 
Inc., the arguments of counsel having been heard, the 
depositions of Leonard Telford, Randy Telford, William Terrill, 
Morgan Gary Lunt, Michael Koenig, Don Dvorak, Anthony R. Ward, 
Christopher Lawrence Wilson, Dale Jackman and Vern Thurgood 
were published, arguments of counsel having been heard, and the 
court having founded as a matter of law, Tel-Tech, Inc. 
breached no duty owed to the plaintiff. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Summary Judgment that plaintiff take 
nothing from defendant Tel-Tech, Inc., and the action as to the 
defendant Tel-Tech, Inc. is hereby dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
DATED this J \ ) day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
id. 
Jttdge Scoct Danie l s 
0936v 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Amend Summary Judgment 
and Amended Summary Judgment was served upon counsel listed 
below by mailing a true and corslet copy thereof, first-class 
postage prepaid, on this l r v d a y of October, 1984: 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Mark A. Larsen, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen 6 Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Tel-Tech, Inc. 
William J. Hansen, Esq. 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Western General Dairies, Inc. 
Curtis Drake, Esq. 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Gallagher & Co. 
George Haley, Esq. 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City,. Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Scott Wetzel Co. 
0936w ^S 
ADDENDUM 3 
RAYMOND M. BERRY - A0310 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant TelTech 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. CONGER, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
vs. : 
TELTECH, INC., ARTHUR J. : Civil No. C82-7444 
GALLAGHER & CO., WESTERN Judge Scott Daniels 
GENERAL DAIRY, INC., and : 
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and/or for Relief from Judgmenl 
Granting Defendant TelTech1s Motion for Summary Judgment came 
on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on Friday, 
November 30, 1984, Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, W. Brent 
Wilcox and Colin P. King appearing for the plaintiff, Raymond M. 
Berry and Mark A. Larsen appearing for the defendant TelTech, Ir 
Curtis J. Drake appearing for Gallagher & Co., the arguments of 
counsel having been heard and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises, 
NOW THEREFORE, plaintifffs Motion to Amend and/or for 
Relief from Judgment Granting Defendant TelTechfs Motion for 
Summarv Judgment is denied. 
DATED this I - day of December, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVES AS TO FO 
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge 
W. 3RENT WILCOX 
COLIN ?. KING 
Attornevs for Plaintiff 
fry 




RAYMOND M. £ERRY 
MARKKA. LARSEN 
Attornevs for Defendant TelTech 
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